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1Abstract
Transnational policy networks appear to be an attractive common subject for both Comparative 
Politics and International Relations, if we are interested into the consequences of globalisation 
on public policy-making capacities. This paper focuses on the confrontation between 
approaches which propose these networks as a new (global) governance instrument and a more 
critical analytical perspective. Departing from a theoretical model which analyses transnational 
policy networks as inter-organisational resource exchanges, empirical illustrations focus on 
international organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the 
European Commission, since these organisations play a core role within most transnational 
(or: global) policy networks. The article concludes that transnational policy networks are 
only relevant under very specific empirical conditions, depending on their embeddedness in 
different institutional and structural contexts. Furthermore, transnational policy networks raise 
important questions of democratic legitimacy and accountability.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the panel ”IOs as Learning Organisations? 
IR Meets Organisational Sociology” at the International Studies Association 43rd Annual 
Convention, New Orleans, LA, March 24-28, 2002: ”Dissolving Boundaries: The Nexus 
between Comparative Politics and International Relations”. I wish to thank all participants, in 
particular George Thomas, for their helpful comments.
11. Transnational policy networks as a common ground for international 
relations and comparative politics
Transnational policy networks mark the intersection of current discourses within several 
subdisciplines of political science. Within public policy and comparative politics, the state is 
predominantly being perceived as an internally fragmented actor who also has to co-operate 
with a number of societal actors in order to fulfil its functions. A frequent version of this 
perspective is the model of policy networks, where policy is not being created by a central 
authority (government or parliament), but by the interplay of a number of public and private 
organisations, mainly on the sector level (Mayntz 1993: 40). While these subdisciplines have 
been able to analyse the functioning of these networks as a domestic matter for some time, 
this perception has increasingly been cast into doubt during the 1990s. Especially in border 
regions, but also in case of the Europeanization of an increasing number of policy issues, 
these networks now frequently have a transnational character. Thus, students of public policy 
broadened their subject and now analyse policy networks on the European level (cf., e.g., 
Héritier 1993b, Schumann 1993), whereas specialists on local/regional governments have 
begun to study cross-border networks as a new object of inquiry (cf., e.g., Beck 1997, Blatter 
2000).
At the same time, the state-centric heuristic which dominated international relations (IR) during 
the 1980s, has also increasingly been criticised, although it allows for a rather parsimonious 
modelling of political processes.1 More precisely, this approach has to be called “government-
centric” or “nation-centric”. If mainstream IR authors talk of international relations, they usually 
mean intergovernmental relations. Furthermore, it is assumed that governments represent the 
“national interest” within international relations and that they act as a unitary actor, representing 
not only the state apparatus, but also civil society. Finally, the state-centric heuristic assumes 
that states are the only important actors within international politics, thus discounting the 
role of societal actors (Halliday 1991: 197, Willets 1997: 290f.). During the 1990s, however, 
not only the activities of transnational non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but also the 
“foreign policy” of (sub)state governments and the autonomous role played by international 
secretariats such as the European Commission and the World Bank, increasingly demand a 
more complex approach towards the analysis of international relations.2  
The developments within the domestically and internationally oriented subdisciplines indicate 
an increasing convergence of analytical instruments within political science, with a prominent 
role for a transnational version of the policy network approach. More recently, however, 
transnational policy networks have also become an attractive approach for solving a number of 
public policy problems in the context of globalisation. This is a rather obvious consideration, 
given the important role policy networks play for the process of public policy-making on the 
national level. A number of authors assume that transnational policy networks range among the 
most attractive options to compensate for the (assumed) loss of governmental problem-solving 
capacity – or even allow for a better way of policy making in the future.3  Thus James Rosenau, 
one of the few North American IR specialists who resists the state-centric dominance, assumes 
in his study of transnational sectoral governance that “[...] transnational rule systems tend to 
evolve in a context of hope and progress, a sense of breakthrough, an appreciation that old 
problems can be circumvented and moved toward either the verge of resolution or the edge of 
obsolescence” (Rosenau 1997: 158).
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The most comprehensive treatment of this idea, however, stems form Wolfgang Reinicke 
and his collaborators within the “Global Public Policy”-Project, which, inter alia, has been 
sponsored by the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 
Reinicke assumes that transgovernmental networks, transnational public-private partnerships 
and international organisations are the most important elements of those “global public policy 
networks” which are assumed to effectively counter the challenge of economic globalisation 
(Reinicke 1998: 219f, 228f). “Global Public Policy” is proposed as an alternative to more 
traditional national or inter-governmental action, given that Reinicke does not assume a world 
government to be a realistic alternative (1998: 87). Thus, Reinicke takes the core idea of the 
policy network concept – co-operation of a number of public and private corporate actors 
during policy-making and implementation on a sector level – and transfers it to the global 
level, assuming that it will lead to legitimate and efficient policies (1998: 89f). Reinicke is 
rather optimistic regarding the possibility of network management – departing from a “global 
governance audit”, he intends to fill in the holes in the comprehensive “global public policy 
network”. In the context of the “UN Vision Project on Global Public Policy”, Reinicke and 
his numerous collaborators have identified an impressive range of these networks, including a 
number of principles for network management (cf. Reinicke/Deng et al. 2000).
This paper intends to conduct a more sober investigation into these rather euphoric assumptions, 
by analysing transnational policy networks in a number of regions, policy areas and on different 
levels. It focuses on the confrontation between the approaches described above, which propose 
these networks as a new, rather universal governance instruments and a more critical analytical 
perspective. The latter departs from a theoretical model which analyses transnational policy 
networks as inter-organisational resource exchanges. Central to this model – and its empirical 
illustration – is the question, under which conditions transnational policy networks are 
relevant at all. Relevance means that a given political decision-making approach may be better 
explained by referring to resource exchanges between corporate actors, than to negotiations 
between governments (or purely domestic politics). The most important reason for this specific 
perspective on transnational policy networks is the experience with the earlier discussion on 
transnational relations, where a too general, too optimistic assessment of non-governmental 
actors in world politics has finally led to a major backlash of state-centric approaches (cf. 
Risse-Kappen 1995b: 7f, 14f). Thus, it is necessary to come to a rather careful assessment 
of transnational policy networks, based on comprehensive empirical evidence. Still, I agree 
with Reinicke/Deng et al. (2000) that transnational policy networks are a rather important 
and innovative topic of research.4  My scepticism, however, relates to the overly optimistic 
representation of these networks as rather universally useful instruments of political steering. 
Transnational policy networks are only relevant under certain, rather restrictive, empirical 
conditions. Furthermore, the normative assessment of these networks has to be conducted in 
a more nuanced manner.5 As a point of departure for the latter, I choose the differentiation 
between input and output legitimacy by Fritz Scharpf, assuming that both criteria have to be 
met in order to allow for a legitimate rule within transnational policy networks:
“Democracy aims at collective self-determination. It must thus be understood as a two-dimensional 
concept, relating to the inputs and to the outputs of the political system at the same time. On the input 
side, self-determination requires that political choices should be derived, directly or indirectly, from 
the authentic preferences of citizens and that, for that reason, governments must be held accountable 
to the governed. On the output side, however, self-determination implies effective fate control. 
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Democracy would be an empty ritual if the political choices of governments would not be able to 
achieve a high degree of effectiveness in achieving the goals, and avoiding the dangers, that citizens 
collectively care about. Thus, input-oriented authencity, and output-oriented effectiveness are equally 
essential elements of democratic self-determination” (Scharpf 1997:19, emphasis in original).6 
In order to operationalize these rather abstract concepts, I focus, regarding input-legitimacy, on 
the nature of interests, which are able to influence policy-making within transnational policy 
networks. Regarding output-legitimacy, the question whether these networks contribute to an 
effective problem solving will be paramount.7 Before I analyse policy networks within a number 
of empirical settings regarding these criteria, I develop a model which explains under which 
circumstances transnational policy networks will be relevant at all and how policy-making 
within these networks works. Before we can make a comprehensive judgement regarding the 
desirability of these networks, however, we first have to systematically identify them.
 
2. With a little help from organisational sociology: The embedded resource-
dependency theory of transnational policy networks
2.1 The dependent variable: (Inter-) Governmental decision-making or resource 
exchanges between transnational corporate actors
The most sophisticated treatment of policy networks within domestic settings is based on 
categories of (inter-) organisational sociology, which assume that political decision-making 
and implementation is mainly based on the exchange of material and immaterial resources 
between mutually – but frequently asymmetrically – dependent organisations.8 Sociological 
inter-organisation theories are based on an organisation-environment perspective, where 
the most important features of this environment are other organisations (cf. Jansen 1995). 
Advantages of this model include the possibility to fall back upon an extensive range of 
concepts and methods within organisational sociology and its relatively neutral assumptions 
regarding the steering capacity of these networks – both properties which should allow for 
a sober and systematic assessment of the assumptions outlined above. For the application in 
political science research, however, concepts from (inter-) organisational sociology have to be 
embedded into the institutional and – as constructivists sometimes tend to forget – structural 
features of the political arena.
Given the confrontation of traditional state-centric approaches within international relations 
and the equally classical domestic bias of comparative politics and policy analysis on the one 
side, with more recent transnational approaches on the other side, I choose the dichotomy of 
government-centric politics and transnational resource exchanges between corporate actors9 
as the dependent variable of my study. Thus, empirical studies will first focus on the question 
whether the political decision-making process under review may better be explained as a 
transnational resource exchange process between public and private organisations or as an 
intergovernmental negotiation (or purely domestic) process. In a second step, the activities 
of transnational policy networks will be briefly analysed according to the dual criteria of 
legitimacy as outlined above.
My definition of transnational policy networks thus combines elements of the resource 
dependency school within organisational sociology with the concept of transnationalism as 
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outlined by Risse-Kappen (1995b: 3): transnational policy networks are defined as a group of 
public and/or private organisations where at least one organisation does not operate on behalf 
of a national government or an intergovernmental entity. These organisations are connected by 
a significant level of interactions (at least partially) across national boundaries and participate 
in policy making and implementation through an exchange of resources. Typical resources to 
be exchanged in transnational policy networks include finance, information, legitimacy and the 
offer of participation in policy design. Actors within transnational policy networks include all 
types of public and private organisations, including interest groups, subnational governments, 
state agencies, and international secretariats. Networks generally are grouped for a certain issue 
area but may vary in their saliency during different phases of the policy process. Actors within 
these networks are to a varying degree dependent on resources which other actors control. 
Thus, the European Commission, for example, allows an interest group a role in policy design 
or in the allocation of funds during implementation, while at the same time the interest group 
provides the Commission with information and legitimacy. Whereas the interest group may 
largely rely on the Commission for political influence, the Commission may choose among a 
number of competing interests.
Other forms of transnational interactions such as investment, communication and data flows as 
well as the diffusion of cultural norms are excluded by this definition.10 Similarly, my model 
differs from alternative models of post-national politics by its focus on organisations and resource 
dependencies. More recently, a number of authors have highlighted the relevance of “epistemic 
communities” (Haas 1992), “transnational human rights networks” (Forschungsgruppe 
Menschenrechte 1998), or of “transnational advocacy coalitions” (Keck/Sikkink 1998). These 
concepts share some parallels with the model of “advocacy coalitions” (Sabatier 1987) within 
public policy and highlight the power of persuasion within the political process. While these 
constructivist approaches towards transnational networks focus on interpersonal networks based 
on shared ideas and on long-term socialisation and institutionalisation processes, my network 
model departs from relatively stable interests of corporate actors and existing institutions, 
thereby providing a snapshot on a higher level of abstraction. I justify my concentration by 
referring to the need of complexity reduction. Furthermore, I doubt that persuasion processes 
may erase fundamental societal conflicts of interest and considerable differences of power as 
assumed by some of the constructivist approaches. 
The following investigation will thus focus on the question under which conditions transnational 
policy networks are relevant empirically. A high number of international interactions may 
basically be modelled as transnational resource exchanges, e.g. by disaggregating the 
participating governments into a number of ministries. Similarly, most domestic political 
processes may contain some participation by a transnational actor. Given the need for 
theoretical parsimony, however, it does not make sense to prematurely give up the more simple 
state-centric or domestic models (cf. Risse-Kappen 1995b: 9). Under which conditions does it 
now pay to think in transnational rather than in the established inter-governmental or domestic 
categories? The concept of policy network alone is not able to provide for an answer to these 
questions. Given its open character, it may, however, be combined with assumptions stemming 
from other theoretical contexts. Thus, it has to be embedded into more comprehensive 
theoretical discussions, both regarding causal hypotheses and normative standards. My 
approach combines the resource exchange approach from organisational sociology with 
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political science concepts of different origins. I will demonstrate how different aspects of the 
national and international, as well as the public and private context lead to specific divisions of 
resources between corporate actors, thus leading to more or less favourable conditions for the 
relevance of transnational policy networks.
2.2 Independent variables from international relations, comparative politics and public 
policy
First assumptions regarding the relevance of transnational policy networks are to be found 
within Thomas Risseʻs studies on transnational relations. Risse argues that the importance of 
transnational relations depends, on the one side, on institutional features of the “target states” 
of transnational actors, and, on the other side, on the degree of international institutionalisation 
of the policy sector concerned (cf. Risse-Kappen 1995b, 1995c). In contrast to Risse, who – 
based on a constructivist understanding – highlights the importance of variable preferences 
and processes of persuasion, I will complement these arguments with a more interest-based 
approach. Again, I avoid rediscovering the wheel and trying to build upon established 
theories within several subdisciplines of political science. Based on an iterative process 
between theoretical deduction and empirical induction, my research has identified eight 
factors that determine whether a certain decision-making process is better analysed from an 
intergovernmental or a transnational policy network perspective. Four of these factors relate to 
the national level, four to the international level; similarly four are based on an interest-based 
background and four on an institutional background: 
Independent variables Interest-based Institutional
National background Homogeneity of
societal interests 
National institutionalisation of 
societal interests
Policy type Institutional fragmentation
of the nation state
International background Functional interdependence International institutionalisation
Rent-seeking Institutional interdependence
2.2.1 Interest-based explanations
A classical observation of research on interest groups in domestic politics is that not all 
societal interests are equally well organised and powerful. Homogeneous interests are much 
easier to organise than heterogeneous ones (cf. Kohler-Koch 1996: 194). The same applies 
to the transnational level – or even more so, given the larger number of actors involved. It is 
much easier to form a powerful interest association that is able to mobilise resources and to 
influence policies on the transnational level, if this association is based on a limited number 
of rather homogeneous interests, than in case of a large number of divergent interests. Thus, a 
business sector, which is dominated by a few large multinational companies, tends to a more 
transnational type of interest representation than a sector where small- and medium scale 
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companies from a number of states are dominant.11 Other societal interests, being even more 
heterogeneous and diffuse, such as consumers or women, also face considerable restrictions 
for a powerful association on the transnational level. Sectors with powerful transnational 
interest groups are more probable to be characterised by transnational policy networks than 
sectors with weak transnational groups or predominantly national groups.
An equally classical assumption of public policy studies is that distributive, redistributive 
and regulative policies matter. This distinction is based on the old – and not uncontroversial – 
assumption of Theodore Lowi (1972) that “policies determine politics”. If funds are 
redistributed, financial consequences are obvious, and winners and losers are easily identified, 
intergovernmental decision-making will prevail. National governments (and parliaments) are 
not willing to give up their predominant role in redistributive spending. On the other side, the 
transnational tendency of distributive policies is supported by the need to develop exchange 
relationships between donor (e.g. the European Commission or the World Bank) and recipient 
of funds (e.g. a subnational government or a business enterprise), where the latter provides the 
former with legitimacy and information regarding the efficient allocation of funds.12  
If theories of international relations are the point of departure, it seems reasonable to suppose 
that there is a close correlation between functional interdependence and transnational politics, 
given that those concepts have been so closely related during the classical discussion of the 
early 1970s; in fact, they are being treated as synonymous by some authors today (cf., e.g., 
Viotti/Kauppi 1993: 239-245). It may be assumed that a strong interdependence between 
territorial units for solving functional problems (e.g. environmental degradation or volatility of 
financial markets) may contribute to an increased relevance of transnational policy networks, 
by providing substate actors with incentives to pool resources for common cross-border 
solutions.
Theorists working in the field of development and transformation studies frequently argue 
that it is hardly possible to apply Western concepts of political science outside of the OECD-
world (cf. Schlichte/Wilke 2000). The same consideration holds for the concept of policy 
networks. Taking Hartmut Elsenhansʻ (1985: 143-151) concept of rent-seeking societies as my 
point of departure, I assume that political processes within Third World countries do hardly 
follow the pattern of resource exchanges between formal organisations in policy networks. 
Within rent-seeking societies, the business sector is less focused on gaining its income through 
market competition, but receiving its resources mainly in the form of rents, which have been 
siphoned off by administrative means. Since most societal groups are supported by clientelistic 
relationships with factions of the state apparatus, the prospects for the development of a 
resource-rich civil society independent of the state are dim. The central political dynamics 
of rent-seeking societies are rivalries between segments of the dominant state class, which 
hardly take the form of inter-organisational resource exchanges between formally organised 
interest groups, but rather follow the familiar pattern of patronage and clientelism.13 Thus, I 
assume that a high degree of rent seeking is detrimental to the relevance of transnational policy 
networks.
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2.2.2 Institutional explanations
Exchange processes in transnational policy networks are embedded in national and international 
institutions. Again, institutions determine whether these exchanges become central to political 
processes at all. The relevance of policy networks by definition arises in situations in which 
mutual resource dependencies and the dispersion of political capacities among actors are 
perceived to exist. These dependencies and this dispersion of resources, however, cannot be 
taken for granted (Conzelmann 1995: 140f.). Thus, studies which applied the policy network 
approach to domestic politics conclude that
“[...] policy networks are not useful tools for analysing all political systems. The approach assumes a 
degree of pluralism, the relative separation of public and private actors, and complex policies needing 
many resources, which are not concentrated in the state. For example, if resources are concentrated in 
a strong national gatekeeper, policy networks are less likely to emerge and, where they do exist, will 
be less important for explaining policy outcomes” (Rhodes/Bache/George 1996: 382f).
This account highlights two main factors, the relationships between public and private actors 
and the unitarian character of the state apparatus. There are obvious parallels between this 
characterisation of the state and Thomas Risseʻs reformulation of the concept of transnationalism, 
highlighting the importance of domestic structures. The first element of domestic structures 
that determines the influence of transnational actors according to Risse is the degree to which 
the state is characterised by fragmentation or centralisation (cf. Risse-Kappen 1995b). In case 
of a unitary or centralised state, it is less probable that subnational governments or single 
ministries will conduct their own “foreign policy” than in a federal or fragmented state with 
much more dispersed resources. Similarly, transnationally operating interest groups find 
highly centralised states more difficult to access than fragmented ones. This assumption relates 
both to the difference between federal and unitary states (i.e. different degrees of vertical 
fragmentation), and to different degrees of centralisation of decision-making on the national 
level, e.g., within a chancellery instead of a division of decision-making between a number of 
ministries, parliament etc. (horizontal fragmentation).
Regarding the degree of national institutionalisation of the dominant societal interest, my 
assumption again is based on the research on interest intermediation on the domestic level. 
One of the core concepts of this research is the distinction between plural, society-centred 
and corporatist, state-centred forms of interest intermediation. If interest groups traditionally 
co-operate very closely with the state – especially in corporatist arrangements – they have 
considerable difficulties to further their cause on the transnational level and, therefore, continue 
to utilise national avenues for interest representation (cf. Streeck 1998: 177). Thus, unions will 
find national channels for interest representation more attractive than transnational ones. Other 
interests that have grown largely independent of state support (e.g. multinational enterprises 
in some sectors), or have developed in opposition to the state (e.g. certain social movements), 
find it much easier to mobilize the necessary exchange resources on the transnational level.
Turning to theories of international relations, we may again draw from Thomas Risseʻs 
reformulation of transnationalism. One of the core causes for the varying influence of 
transnational actors according to Risse stems from the different degree of international 
institutionalisation of policy areas. Thus, the legitimacy of a transnational actorʻs issue may 
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be enhanced by an appeal to a generally accepted international norm (Risse-Kappen 1995b: 
29-32). I may add that not only the structural role of international norms, but also the agency 
of an international secretariat may support the development of a transnational policy network. 
A more specific case of international institutionalisation may be described as institutional 
interdependence. Institutional interdependence is being created by legal requirements for 
a public actor to co-operate on a transnational level with other corporate actors, somehow 
comparable to the concept of “Politikverflechtung” (Scharpf /Reissert/Schnabel 1976) in 
federal state systems. In the EU multi-level system, the most well-known case of these 
regulations is the so-called “partnership principle” which requires member state governments 
and the Commission to co-operate with subnational governments – and societal actors – in 
order to receive EU structural funds. Legal requirements of institutional interdependence so 
conceived lead to the development of transnational policy networks.
3. Empirical illustration of transnational policy networks with a special 
focus on international organisations 
3.1 Case selection: International secretariats as actors in and addressees of transnational 
policy networks
I have provided a number of hypotheses which specify under which conditions we may assume 
a strong relevance of resource exchange processes in transnational policy networks. At the 
same time, these hypotheses have made clear how aspects of the national and international 
environment influence the distribution of resources between corporate actors on the transnational 
level and thus provide for the basis of these exchange networks. Based on these assumptions 
I will now turn to the investigation of transnational policy networks in a number of empirical 
settings. These empirical studies focus on two questions, namely the relevance of transnational 
policy networks vis-à-vis the state-centric model and the ability of these networks to accord 
to both the input and output criteria of democratic legitimacy. My empirical studies are based 
on a comparable cases strategy (Lijphart 1975) that is common practice in a situation where a 
relatively large number of variables are to be tested by a small number of cases. Still, we may 
considerably enlarge the number of cases by making precise distinctions between policy areas, 
regional units and periods of time (including different phases of the policy process), whereas 
the number of variables will be limited by a rather general dichotomy of the dependent variable 
(transnational policy network or state-centric decision-making). The main criterion for case 
selection is then whether the cases under review differ regarding this dependent variable and, 
if at all possible, only one independent variable. In the following, I will briefly scrutinise a 
number of comparisons as an illustration of my research design.14 
The focus of the empirical evidence contained in this paper is on international organisations 
(IOs) more specifically: on international secretariats. This is a core distinction for any 
study of transnational policy networks. Most international organisations are mainly fora for 
intergovernmental negotiations. Examples include the general UN system, most regional 
integration schemes in the ʻSouth  ʼ and even the World Trade Organisation. In terms of 
transnational policy networks (and of organisational sociology more generally), international 
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organisations are relevant as corporate actors to the extent that they contain a bureaucracy 
which is capable of autonomous action.15 Otherwise, international organisations may well 
be analysed through a state-centric approach (such as classical regime theory), as a venue 
for negotiations and decision-making among national governments. In order to distinguish 
transnational acting bureaucracies from whole international organisations as intergovernmental 
arenas, I call them ʻinternational secretariatsʼ. Of course, each IO contains a bureaucracy, 
even if this frequently is only a very tiny one. In order to operationalise this distinction, two 
features of international secretariats become important, namely the volume of resources 
(finance and staff) at their disposal and the range as well as the political significance of the 
tasks given to them by their member states. The three most important international secretariats 
are the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) – more specifically: the core organisation16 – and 
the European Commission.17 These three secretariats have not only a large number of staff at 
their disposal, but also the most impressive range of political competencies.18 Although there is 
considerable discussion on national entanglements in the decision-making of these secretariats, 
one may conclude that in most cases they are able to autonomously decide upon their day-to-
day operations. Thus, any study of the respective international organisations through a purely 
intergovernmental approach would surely miss its mark.
International secretariats play two important, but very different, roles in transnational policy 
networks.19 On the one hand, international secretariats are important actors in these networks, 
very often with a large share of responsibility for the outcome of these interactions. Thus, 
the European Commission plays an important role in European policy networks leading to 
regulations of the Common Market, whereas the BWI staff uses its resources to thoroughly 
influence economic policy-making in developing and transformation countries. On the 
other hand, international secretariats may be perceived as political decision-makers, thereby 
frequently turning into the targets of the lobbying efforts of other transnational actors. Thus, 
the Commission is surrounded by hundreds of interest associations, whereas the BWI have 
become the prime (IO) targets of transnational advocacy NGOs.20 Through the first role 
the second becomes politically important: Given the political weight of these international 
secretariats, other transnational actors may exercise political influence through changing 
the organisational routines of Commission, International Monetary Fund or the World Bank 
(e.g. project selection procedures in case of the latter). I use this distinction of the roles of 
international secretariats within transnational policy networks to structure my empirical 
illustration. Together with the two main organisational cases we receive four empirical settings 
in which my theoretical approach may be illustrated. In the following, I will use each of the 
four cells to briefly illustrate the working of two of my variables.21
Structure of empirical illustration European Commission BWI secretariats
Change by international
Secretariats (exogenous)
Multilevel governance in
the European Union (3.1)
Transgovernmental co-ordination: 
the case of foreign assistance (3.3)
Change within international
Secretariats (endogenous)
Interest intermediation in
the European Union (3.2)
Contesting global governance: 
NGOs and the BWI (3.4)
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3.2 The European Commission as an actor: Multilevel governance in the European 
Union22
3.2.1 Institutional interdependence: The 1988 reform of the regional development funds
My first example demonstrates the role of institutional interdependence for the increased 
relevance of transnational policy networks in general and of the European Commission in 
particular by comparing regional development policy before and after the major reform of 1988. 
Before 1988, structural policy was an obvious case of intergovernmentalism, where funding 
decisions were made in closed-door negotiations between national administrations, with a very 
limited influence by the Commission. The only major issue was the division of national shares 
of the overall volume of funds, which obviously lent itself to an intergovernmental perspective. 
Regional development policy was mainly used for side payments between member states  ʼ
governments (Ansell/Parsons/Darden 1997: 351). The 1988 reforms, however, introduced the 
partnership principle for the third phase of the multiannual funding cycle. Basically, there are 
now three main phases within the five-year regional development funding cycle (cf. Marks 
1996: 314, Ansell/Parsons/Darden 1997: 363f.): 
1.  Negotiations on the financial volume of EU regional development policy.
2.  Creation of the institutional framework (e.g., eligibility criteria).
3. Planning of specific programs (Regional Development Plans, Community Support 
Frameworks, Operational Programs) and implementation of projects.
These three phases differ significantly regarding the relevance of transnational policy networks – 
or multi-level governance more generally. The first phase is firmly intergovernmental. The 
second phase still is rather intergovernmental, however, with a prominent and independent role 
for the European Commission.23 During the third phase, then, transnational policy networks 
become central, especially for the selection and implementation of specific projects, where 
coalitions between the Commission and subnational actors play a major role (cf. Marks 1996: 
315-398, Ansell/Parsons/Darden 1997: 364-368). In order to explain this variation, we have to 
study the perception of different policy types during those three phases: especially during the 
first phase, structural policy is perceived as a redistributive policy, a ʻzero-sum gameʼ, where 
member state governments closely watch their gains and losses. Thus, they are not willing to 
delegate decision-making to other actors. However, during the second phase, this state-centric 
logic is already being reduced, because redistributive consequences become less obvious. 
Consequently, autonomous policy-making by the Commission becomes more relevant. Multi-
level governance between regions, national ministries and the Commission, however, is an 
adequate description of EU regional development policy only during the programming and 
implementation of single projects. Now, regional development funding is being perceived as a 
distributive policy, thereby allowing corporate actors to focus on their organisational motives, 
especially in case of the Commission and subnational state actors (cf. Marks 1996: 317f.). 
At the core of the 1988 reform, however, is the introduction of the partnership principle into 
the third phase of the funding cycle. The Commission now asks member states for detailed, 
comprehensive plans for the utilisation of regional development funds. Furthermore, these plans 
have to be designed with the active support of national governments (ʻvertical partnershipʼ) 
and private actors (ʻhorizontal partnershipʼ) on the regional level. The consequences for the 
pattern of EU decision-making are as follows:
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“[...] as the Commission now asks for co-ordinated, long-term policy schemes, more information 
is required and the level of complexity increases. More actors have to be taken on board in order 
to channel additional information resources into the procedure. Networks between all territorial 
levels – supranational, national, regional, and local – have to be installed in order to keep the process 
manageable and efficient.
[...] the ʻpartnership  ʼprinciple seeks to install the institutional framework within which consultation 
and networking between all levels involved can be organised. The political logic behind it is to break 
up the orbit of closed-door negotiations between supranational and national administrations. Instead, 
the ʻpartnership  ʼprinciple seeks to generate ʻopen  ʼnetworks, through which a permanent exchange 
of ideas, data and influence can take place [...] The inclusion of more actors, however, also threatens 
national control over the management of funds. Furthermore, the status of sub national actors may be 
enhanced” (Conzelmann 1995: 139).
While the original idea of (rich) EU member states was to introduce a mechanism for the 
enhanced control of regional development funding (in poor member states), given the strongly 
increased level of funding in preparation of “1992”, the more specific Commission proposal 
in effect introduced a considerable degree of institutional interdependence in EU regional 
development decision making. In effect, the 1988 reforms not only generated more open, 
transnational policy networks, but also enhanced the status of subnational actors as well as the 
Commission and limited national government control over the management of funds, thereby 
affecting the relationship between national governments and the regional level in a number 
of EU member states (cf. Marks 1996: 336-338, Smyrl 1995). At the core of this exercise in 
network creation are increased inter-organisational resource dependencies:
“For the Commission, regional connections bring new sources of information and political support 
for its programmes. Information flowing from regions, particularly on the workings of SF (Structural 
Funds, A.N.) programmes, makes the Commission less directly dependent on national government 
sources [...] Politically, Commission officials do little to disguise their attempts to cultivate potential 
allies in sub national government (who may ultimately pressure the Commissionʼs main interlocutors 
at the national level).
Regional actors, in turn, may be willing to lend this political support for several reasons. From the 
Commission they too obtain useful information – not just on SF policy-making, but also on other EU 
policies from which they are generally excluded. Politically, while the Commission is usually careful 
not to intrude into general national-sub national conflicts, many regional officials see partnership with 
the Commission as prestigious and legitimating sub national power [...] More directly, [...] regions 
may profit from the support the Commission lends to regional priorities which diverge from national 
priorities in regional development” (Ansell/Parsons/Darden 1997: 359).
In conclusion, it did not make sense to speak of multi-level governance in the case of EU 
regional development funding before 1988. Afterwards, it does – but only in selected phases 
of the program cycle and in certain member states (cf. 3.2.2). Furthermore, it may be assumed 
that this case of network creation by design contributes to a higher quality of problem solving 
if we assume that financial support programs which are based on the analytical and legitimacy 
resources of a number of societal and substate actors, are more effective than centrally planned 
ones (cf. Marks 1996: 325f). This network management, however, has detrimental effects on 
the freedom of manoeuvre of national governments, which, consistently, have tried to reduce 
the degree of institutional interdependence during the 1993 reform of the regional development 
funds (cf. Hooghe 1996: 117). Correspondingly, the democratic legitimacy of the reformed 
fund management is somehow limited when the weakening of the veto position of national 
parliaments is being taken into account, hardly being compensated for by an increasing role 
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of parliaments on the European or regional level; also the social partnership principle is only 
being applied selectively (cf. Benz 1998: 575).
3.2.2 (Vertical) Administrative fragmentation: Comparing transnational co-operation in 
the INTERREG program in the Lake Contance and the Upper Rhine Valley regions
Transnational co-operation in border regions has been portrayed for some time as a prime 
example of the “debordering of the world of states” (Brock/Albert 1995). Especially in the 
context of the study of European border regions, the potential contribution towards problem-
solving and international understanding has been highlighted (cf. Malchus 1975 as the classical 
contribution). A more detailed treatment of cross-border co-operation initiatives demonstrates, 
however, the great variety of undertakings, including purely private initiatives, several forms 
of symbolic politics, but also cross-border political coalitions and formal intergovernmental 
organisations (cf. Blatter 1998: 21-40). Given our preoccupation with the relevance and 
normative assessment of transnational policy networks, only a small fraction of these co-
operative undertakings becomes relevant, namely those cases where a number of societal and 
substate actors exchange resources in order to influence the political decision of at least one 
(sub)state actor. 
Both the Lake Constance region and the Upper Rhine Valley thrive by a great variety of trans-
border co-operation arrangements. A closer look on the nature of the co-operation arrangements 
demonstrates that the Constance region is much more characterised by transnational policy 
networks than the Upper Rhine region, which still very frequently is being dominated by a 
state-centric logic. The latter specifically takes the shape of intergovernmental commissions 
and regimes, such as the “Oberrhein-Ausbaukommission” or the “Internationale Kommission 
zum Schutz des Rheins gegen Verunreinigung” (cf. Beck 1997: 101f; Blatter 1998: 227-230). 
Even on a highly decentralised level of co-operation such as the “Oberrheinkonferenz”, where 
German state governments, French regions and Swiss cantons are being represented, the 
national logic of representation rules supreme (Blatter 1998: 232). Around Lake Constance, 
in contrast, corporate actors assume cross-border, functional definitions of interest such as 
environmental protection or support of small enterprises, whereas at least on the German side 
the national perspective is hardly relevant anymore (Blatter 1998: 234).
A more detailed study of the concrete transnational resource exchanges demonstrates that 
these exchanges in both regions have, inter alia, been motivated by an increase in institutional 
interdependence, especially in the form of supporting programs by the European Union such as 
INTERREG. The INTERREG-program is part of the structural policy of the European Union. 
Its main purpose is to promote cross-border co-operation on the local and regional level. As a 
“Community Initiative”, it is programmed and administered by the Commission, with only very 
limited oversight by the member states. Funds from this Community initiative become only 
available, however, if projects are planned and executed by local and regional partners from 
both sides of the borders. Thus the INTERREG-program induces in both regions a number of 
corporate actors from both sides of the border to pool their analytical and financial resources 
as well as their legitimacy as transnational partners for projects mobilising additional funding 
by the Commission (Blatter 1998: 231). In the accompanying committees of the INTERREG-
program the higher degree of transnationalisation in the Lake Constance region again becomes 
obvious, whereas the co-operation in the Upper Rhine Valley is marked (and restricted) by the 
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traditional state-centric pattern. Whereas the formal standing orders of both accompanying 
committees were practically identical, the practice of co-operation demonstrates significant 
differences. Co-operation around the Upper Rhine has been hampered by distributive conflicts 
along national lines, whereas this type of problem has not affected the Lake Constance co-
operation pattern – in spite of very unbalanced contributions by Swiss actors and those from 
Baden-Wuerttemberg.
In a comparative perspective, the differences between both border regions may best be 
explained by the different state structures of the participating countries. The rather unitarian 
French structure explains a large share of the rather state-centric co-operation in the Upper 
Rhine Valley. The federal character of the three states around Lake Constance, in contrast, 
allows for the easy development of transnational policy networks (cf. Blatter 1998: 278-282). 
The importance of a high degree of vertical fragmentation for the relevance of transnational 
policy networks is not limited to cross-border co-operation, but also relates to the EU regional 
development policy in general. Again, the study by Gary Marks (1996) is instructive. Marks 
does not only compare different phases of EU regional development policy regarding their 
relevance for multi-level governance, but also EU member states regarding their implementation 
of the partnership principle. His study demonstrates that not all substate actors are able to 
seize the opportunity provided by the high degree of institutional interdependence (and 
distributive policy perception) in the third phase of regional development policy programming 
(after 1988). The extent to which transnational policy networks between the Commission, the 
national government and substate actors evolve, varies considerably from country to country. 
In countries with a high degree of institutional fragmentation – especially in terms of a federal 
state structure – regions are able to engage in multi-level governance. Otherwise, the central 
government is also forced to consult regional actors regarding certain information for regional 
planning, but firmly retains control of the overall planning exercise. Thus we find meaningful 
transnational policy networks in case of Belgium, Germany, and certain regions in Spain, but 
not in case of France, Great Britain, Greece, or Ireland (Marks 1996: 326, Ansell/Parsons/
Darden 1997: 364f.).
Coming back to cross-border co-operation, the inclusion of resources stemming from both 
public and societal actors and actors of both sides of the border within these networks, allow for 
a rather successful problem solution, e.g., regarding water quality or the selection of regional 
development projects (cf. Blatter 1998: 122-125, 157f). There is, however, a certain tension 
between problem-solving capacity and the freedom of manoeuvre of national governments, 
especially in the French case. There is, furthermore, no automatism between cross-border co-
operation and democratic governance. Not only the cross-border collaboration of parliamentary 
groupings proves to be rather awkward (cf. Blatter 1998: 116-119, 151f), but also societal 
groups differ considerably regarding the degree of their transnational co-operation, with 
obvious advantages for economic interests, and to a lesser degree, environmental protection 
groups (but not unions, consumers etc.). Finally, the problems associated with the unitarian 
French state structure point towards a major limitation of the relevance of transnational policy 
networks based on vertical institutional fragmentation, given the large number of unitarian 
states on a world-wide scale and the complexity of decentralisation reforms.
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3.3 The European Commission as an addressee: Interest intermediation in the European 
Union
3.3.1 International institutionalisation: Different degrees of “greening” of structural 
policy instruments
The ”transnationalisation” of structural policy is not only limited to certain time periods (after 
1988), phases of the project cycle (planning/implementation) and countries (federal ones), 
but also to certain structural policy instruments. The most important difference is between the 
main Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, introduced in 1993. Whereas the ”partnership 
principle” has induced a selective transnationalisation of the Structural Funds, the Cohesion 
Fund remains firmly intergovernmental. Thus, regional actors have few options to be involved 
in programming of the Cohesion Fund and to play any independent role in transnational 
politics. Similarly, the ability of the Commission to decide upon the design and management 
of the Cohesion Fund remains limited. The firm control of member state governments over 
the Cohesion Fund also limits the ability of transnationally acting environmental NGOs to 
enhance the attention given to environmental concerns within the management of this fund – in 
sharp contrast to the ”greening” of the Structural Funds. Although these funds – the first one, 
the European Regional Development Fund has been established in 1975 – did not have any 
ecological orientation for a number of years, they have become considerably ”greener” during 
the 1993 reform of structural funding. Lenschow (1995: 9f) summarises the legal changes 
(proposed by the Commission), which have been accompanied by procedural changes, as 
follows:
“Among the new elements to be included in the development plans was an evaluation of the 
environmental impact of the strategy and operations proposed in terms of sustainable development 
principles. This requirement was intended to contribute to the prevention of environmental harm; it 
also added an environmental criterion that can be monitored.  
Secondly, the new regulations reinforce the principle of compatibility with other Community policies 
in the area of environmental policy [...]. Aside from providing a framework for sustainable planning 
in general, this article was important from an institutional point of view. National governments were 
now obliged to integrate environmental authorities in the preparation phase of regional programs. This 
requirement constitutes a potential substitute for the politically unlikely alternative of strengthening 
the Commissionʼs powers to monitor environmental compliance on the ground”.
The Cohesion Fund, in contrast, does not contain any comparable ecological safeguards (cf. 
Lenschow 1995: 11-16). The contrast to the Cohesion Fund is the more striking, as it has 
been established during the same 1993 reform of regional development policy. Furthermore, 
both the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund have been at the centre of comprehensive 
campaigns by environmental NGOs. Most of the environmental changes within the Structural 
Funds match the demands of the NGOs. Thus, it has to be explained why transnational NGOs 
have been able to influence the regulations (proposed by the Commission) in case of the 
Structural Funds, but not of the Cohesion Fund (cf. Lenschow 1995: 23-33, Mazey/Richardson 
1994: 32-40).
For a more detailed study of decision-making on the European level, we have to disaggregate 
the institutions of the Union, with special attention being devoted to the different degrees 
of international institutionalisation. Firstly, the role of the European Parliament (EP) varies 
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widely regarding different pieces of regulation: some need its assent, others do not. The degree 
of international institutionalisation is much higher in the first case. Secondly, decisions in the 
Council of Ministers may require unanimity or only a (qualified) majority. Given the strong role 
of each member state in the first case, international institutionalisation is much higher in the 
latter. Thirdly, the role and responsibility of the Commission (and, correspondingly, the degree 
of international institutionalisation) differs widely between issues, as demonstrated above. 
Given the huge size of the Commission and its internal sectoral fragmentation, for certain 
issues it finally does not make sense to treat the Commission as one single organisation. Thus, 
for the purposes of this study I consider single Directorates General (DGs) as corporate actors 
of their own right.24 In the cases under review, DG XI (environment), DG XVI (administration 
of structural funds) and DG XIX (budget) are the most relevant. Different standings of these 
DGs in terms of prestige within the Commission also contribute to the explanation of the 
puzzle outlined above.
Point of departure of the NGO campaigns were experiences with environmental destructions 
caused by Strucural Funds  ʼprojects (e.g. dams, road, and tourism) during the late 1980s. Based 
on a comprehensive survey of the ecological effects of recent reforms of the EUʼs structural 
policy, NGOs started a major campaign to influence the 1993 reform. Their demands have been 
rather easily accepted in case of the Structural Funds, both by the Commission and, later, by 
the Council. Lenschow gives a detailed account of the resource interdependencies which led 
to these political decisions:
“The responsiveness of the Commission to the proposals of the NGO alliance was not due to the 
allianceʼs successes in mass mobilization and salience creation alone, though. More importantly, in 
my view, the NGOs succeeded in building close ties with ʻinside actorsʼ, i.e. actors that influence 
the decision making in the Community. These ties persisted due to the creation of resource 
interdependencies between the inside actors and the NGOs. In other words, NGOs became participants 
in a policy network close to the decision making centre of the Community. 
Arguably the closest relationship developed between the NGOs and the European Parliament. In its 
vocalisation function the EP proved a valuable instrument for the environmental groups to effectively 
communicate their concerns about specific projects and programs to the Commission and the Council. 
Considering the budgetary powers of the EP, i.e. the need for the Council to ensure Parliamentʼs 
assent prior to changes in the Structural Fund framework regulations, the institution was a particularly 
valuable mouthpiece for the green lobby. The EP, on the other hand, benefited from the information 
and policy analyses prepared by the NGOs. In other words, the effective collaboration between NGOs 
and MEPs (Member of European Parliament, A.N.) resulted from the complimentary nature of their 
resources, information and access. 
Resource interdependencies also developed between NGOs and DGXI. DGXI had been pushing 
DGXVI for better environmental integration and for becoming closer involved in the approval 
process. Armed with the support of a respected lobby, information and sound policy advice, DG XI 
succeeded in deepening its regional knowledge and in becoming more practical in its policy input, 
eventually gaining the acceptance of DGXVI officials as a valuable policy partner. In this position, 
DGXI could effectively argue for its own cause and the one of NGOʼs. 
Finally the campaign benefited from a report by the Court of Auditors that was highly critical of 
the Structural Funds  ʼimpact on the environment. NGOs and EP had provoked that commissioning 
of this report through their public campaigns, their official questions directed at the Commission 
and a number of Court cases challenging the administrators of the Funds (the Commission and the 
Member States). In addition, NGOs and MEPs provided empirical data for the auditors. The resulting 
case references added not only to the content but also to the rhetorical value of the report, hence 
became a tremendous asset for subsequent environmental campaigning. NGOs acknowledged that 
they were assisted by the Court of Auditorʼs report, and the threat to the image and legitimacy of the 
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Commission it represented, in getting their ʻwishlist for reform  ʼ [...] largely incorporated into the 
Commission proposal in early 1993” (Lenschow 1995: 26-28).
In case of the Cohesion Fund, however, the Commission turned down NGO demands. The 
resource dependencies, which allowed for the NGO influences on the Commission in case of 
the Structural Funds, were absent in case of the Cohesion Fund (cf. Lenschow 1995: 34-36). 
Due to the choice of a different legal procedure, the EP did not have a major say in decision-
making. The unanimity rule regulated decision-making in the Council, thus shifting the core 
of the political process to national governments. Within the Commission, the Secretariat 
General and DG XIX (budget) were charged with the administration of the Cohesion Fund; 
due to their predominant orientation upon macroeconomic criteria and their high standing 
within the informal Commission hierarchy, these actors were not in need for the legitimacy 
and information resources of the environmental DG and its NGO coalition partners as was 
DG XVI. Finally, the small amount of responsibility the Commission was having for the 
management of the Cohesion Fund minimised the danger of major trouble with the Court of 
Auditors or the Court of Justice. Taken in perspective, this case demonstrates that transnational 
policy networks may contribute to effective (environmental) problem solving – but at the same 
time these network are only relevant under very specific conditions.
3.3.2 National institutionalisation of societal interests: Comparison of EU science and 
technology programmes regarding the pattern of interest intermediation
Different degrees of transnationalisation of cross-border co-operation on the regional level 
have already demonstrated that recipient features may influence the relevance of transnational 
resource dependencies. Other EU policies address themselves to more or less private actors. 
Science and Technology (S&T) programs, e.g., are suited for private firms as well as for 
public research institutes and universities, with different programs frequently having different 
target groups. Target groups, however, are not always passive recipients of EU programs. In 
most cases, they also try to influence the design and the allocation mechanisms of distributive 
programs or lobby for the establishment of new programs. The European Commission and 
the Council of Ministers are the prime addressees of these lobbying activities. Whether 
societal interests choose to organise transnationally and try to exchange resources with the 
Commission (transnational policy networks), or largely use their established national channels 
of interest intermediation and work through the Council of Ministers (inter-governmental 
policy-making), inter alia depends on the degree to which these societal interests are used to 
further their interests through close collaboration with their national governments.
Since the mid-1980s, the European Union has received a considerable increase of competencies 
in the field of science and technology promotion. Within the subsequent Framework Programs, 
a number of separate sectoral and cross-sectoral research programs have been set up. Given the 
technical character and the speed of decision-making in S&T, the beneficiaries have a larger say 
on the allocation of funds than in most other policy sectors (Peterson/Bomberg 1999: 216). The 
pattern of interest intermediation within these programs, however, varies considerably regarding 
its degree of transnationalisation. The most striking differences are to be found between applied, 
industry-oriented programs and basic, science-oriented programs. Whereas the former may be 
characterised by numerous resource dependencies between transnational interest associations 
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and the Commission, the latter very much follow the traditional intergovernmental pattern 
of decision-making. Furthermore, even within the subsector of industry-related programs, 
considerable differences regarding the degree of transnationalisation of interest intermediation 
may be observed. Thus, within the large programs for the promotion of information technology 
(IT) such as, e.g., the European Strategic Programme for Research in Information Technologies 
(ESPRIT), the Commission co-operates closely with transnational interest groups, especially 
with the European Information Technology Industry Round Table (EITIRT). Decision-making 
on programs designed for small and medium sized firms, such as, e.g., Basic Research for 
Industrial Technologies in Europe (BRITE), in contrast, is more dominated by national 
representations (Grande/Peschke 1997: 20). Thus, we find transnational policy networks as an 
adequate analytical perspective for some subsectors, but intergovernmental decision-making 
for others.25
These heterogeneous patterns may be explained by taking into account the different ability 
of societal interests in different subsectors to organise them in a powerful manner on the 
European level. A small number of big multinational companies in the information technology 
subsector – EITIRT originally had 12 members and now has 14 (Grande/Peschke 1997: 22) – 
is predestined to form a powerful association, whereas thousands of small-scale enterprises, 
due to their more heterogeneous character face insurmountable differences to organise on 
the transnational level. Thus, these firms may prefer to utilise national channels of interest 
representation. National channels look even more attractive to public research institutes and 
research associations, with their close and long-standing relationship to the nation state. If, 
however, the focus is on the famous collaboration between the Commission and EITIRT during 
the early years of EU S&T policy, it is most appropriately analysed as a resource exchange 
in a transnational policy network. These resource dependencies were most important during 
the process of enlargement of EU competencies, thus leading to the typical “co-evolution” 
(Eichener/Voelzkow 1994) of European integration and European level interest formation. 
A more detailed study demonstrates that the Commission is not only a passive addressee in 
European interest intermediation, but also an active manipulator in its strife for additional tasks 
and resources :
“Established in 1980, on invitation from Count Davignon, the Commissioner for Industry, the Round 
Table should serve several purposes. First of all, it should provide the expert knowledge to the 
Commission necessary to the formation of new programmes targeted at the needs of European IT 
industry. In addition, the Round Table was expected to assist the Commission in its political battles 
with the member states over new legal competencies, new programmes and new fiscal resources for 
research and technology. In this respect, the Round Table worked as a “lobbying group” to support the 
process of European integration in S&T policy” (Grande/Peschke 1997: 9).26
It has to be noted, however, that the strong role of the Round Table in EU S&T policy making 
has not remained without criticism. Companies excluded from the EITIRT and member states 
without a Round Table-member, but also trade unions and consumer representations repeatedly 
criticised this arrangement for its lack of representativeness (Grande/Peschke 1997: 23, 
Peterson/Bomberg 1999: 222). Taking a broader perspective, the problem-solving contribution 
by transnational policy networks also becomes questionable. Policy networks by definition 
carry a tendency towards fragmentation. The close collaboration between private and public 
actors within a network is at the cost of a lack of co-ordination between networks. In terms 
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of innovation policy, however, a lack of integration between academic and applied research 
policy networks may become a major setback, given the need for effective linkages between 
the two within a successful innovation policy:
“If the patterns of interest representation in European S&T (Science & Technology, A.N.) policy are 
looked at from the perspective of the German research system, two features are apparent. Firstly, it 
can be seen that the system of interest representation is also highly differentiated. There are special 
organisations for every major type of research: for applied industrial research, for contract research, 
for basic research, etc. Secondly, it can be seen that the pattern of interest intermediation is rather 
segmented [...] universities and research organisations are organised within separate institutions and, 
even more striking, there a no organisational links between industry, academic research and public 
research organisations. In organisational terms at least, industry leads a life of its own; ʻtheory  ʼand 
ʻpractice  ʼ are not connected nor integrated on this level of institutionalisation” (Grande/Peschke 
1997: 11).
3.4 The World Bank as an actor: Transgovernmental co-ordination of foreign assistance 
to Eastern Europe
3.4.1 Rent-seeking: A comparison of assistance co-ordination for Poland and Ukraine
The World Bank multiplies its policy influence in developing and transformation countries by 
its ability to co-ordinate economic assistance by other bi- and multilateral donor agencies.27  
Bank projects alone are of a too limited (financial) weight in order to exercise enough influence 
on the recipient governments  ʼ economic and sectoral policies. If the contributions by other 
donors can be brought in line with those of the Bank, it can multiply its influence upon 
recipient governments as well as increase the effectiveness of the overall assistance effort. As 
in other regions of the world, co-ordination of assistance to Eastern Europe is far from being 
perfect. Both countries and sectors vary in their quality of co-ordination. The effectiveness of 
co-ordination very much depends on transgovernmental networks between donor and recipient 
organisations and/or between donor organisations.28 In this study, I will briefly demonstrate 
that during the mid-1990s the good quality of assistance co-ordination for Poland very much 
relied on a very dense network centered around the Polish recipient organisation Bureau for 
Foreign Assistance/BFA, the European Commission and the World Bank, whereas the bad 
quality of donor-recipient co-ordination for Ukraine reflected a network which was fragmented 
in a number of quasi-clientelistic donor-recipient dyads.29 The different network structures 
for Poland and the Ukraine can be explained by pointing to the much higher degree of rent 
seeking in the latter. In 1995/1996, Poland was one of the most advanced transition economies, 
as measured, for example, by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development/EBRD 
(EBRD 1995, 1996). State and economy had already been separated to a large degree. An 
independent civil society tried to control the spending of public funds, including foreign 
assistance. Given the huge range of alternative sources of income, the incentive to use foreign 
assistance for rent-seeking activities was rather low. Ukraine, in contrast, was among the 
least advanced transition economies. Not only was the transition to a market economy rather 
slow, but also Ukraine developed a political economy where economic wellbeing very much 
depended upon good connections into the state apparatus. In contrast to Poland, state and 
economy remained closely interwoven. Although there were struggles within the political-
economic elite, the old nomenclature, based on the public service and public enterprises, 
clearly remained in power. The control over the allocation of foreign assistance is an important 
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asset in this clientelistic political system. Informal, personalised power structures makes any 
analysis of decision-making based on inter-organisational resource exchange futile. In this 
political-economic environment, the World Bank is severely limited to exercise its lead role in 
donor-recipient co-ordination.
In 1995/1996, the Polish government already was able to fairly effectively co-ordinate external 
assistance, although some bilateral donors still circumvented the BFA and dealt directly with 
Polish sector ministries (cf. Bastian 1997: 64f). Compared to other recipient countries, however, 
the BFA was better able to set priorities of assistance, even against the intentions of some donor 
agencies (cf. Bastian 1997: 65, 66f). The European Commission and the World Bank, as the 
lead agencies on the donor side supported the BFA in its co-ordination function. Although the 
strong co-ordination effort by the BFA somewhat limited the ability of the Commission and 
the Bank to conduct a policy dialogue based on the backing of the Western donor community, 
a strong transgovernmental co-ordination network contributed to the effectiveness of foreign 
assistance to Poland.
Ukraine, however, was a different story. In a six country comparison (including also 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Estonia and Romania), Ukraine is “[...] by far the worst example of 
recipient co-ordination (Bastian 1997: 133). This was on the one side due to the absence of any 
meaningful co-ordination between Ukrainian ministries:
“[...] interministerial co-ordination has never been a topic of discussion in the context of assistance 
co-ordination. There is no mutual interest for contacts on the side of the Ukrainian ministries although 
all assistance-related communication was supposed to go through NAURD (the then co-ordinating 
agency of the Ukrainian government, A.N.) or the respective predecessor agencies, which were meant 
to be in the centre of the co-ordination process” (Bastian 1997: 109).
Correspondingly, central co-ordinating agencies proliferated – at times there were four of 
them – and were reorganised in an almost yearly rhythm, based on a continuing struggle for 
the control of assistance rents. On the other side, single donor agencies and recipient ministries 
found it very convenient to exchange their resources without any interference by central 
recipient or donor co-ordinating agencies. Thus, the donor agency provided financial means 
whereas the recipient ministry allowed the donor to implement a project according to his 
own priorities. Furthermore, the absence of strong central co-ordination allowed for recipient 
ministries to go “project shopping”, confronting as many donors as possible with a long list 
of projects. In this context, it was very difficult for the Bank to conduct a “policy dialogue” 
with the Ukrainian government, based on the comprehensive support of the whole Western 
assistance package. In more general, the effectiveness of external assistance to Ukraine 
remained low, inter alia due to limited over-all co-ordination.
In conclusion, operating in a societal environment, which is characterised by a high degree of 
rent seeking, may considerably weaken the World Bankʼs co-ordination efforts. If recipient 
ministries focus their activities on playing off donors against each other, it is very difficult 
for Bank staff to assemble a coherent program of assistance. Thus, the economic and political 
impact of foreign assistance is being reduced. In heavy rent-seeking societies, policy networks 
are not only absent on the recipient side, but also rather weak – as transnational policy 
networks – in donor-recipient interactions. Although transnational interactions do exist in case 
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of the latter, they frequently have the character of isolated dyads between one donor and one 
recipient ministry. While this may be a rational behaviour for these ministries, comprehensive 
and effective co-ordination is impossible. Given the limits to the democratic character of the 
Ukrainian state and its economic crisis (in 1995/1996), a higher relevance of transnational 
policy networks, centred around a strong and responsible recipient agency as in Poland, might, 
however, be preferable from both input and output-criteria of legitimate democratic rule.
3.4.2 Functional interdependence: A comparison of donor co-ordination for mass 
privatisation and agriculture
There are not only differences between the effectiveness of transgovernmental co-ordination 
network between countries, but also between sectors. At least for big recipient countries, there 
are separate co-ordination arrangements for most important sectors. During the mid-1990s, 
donor agencies dominated this co-ordination process, whereas sectoral ministries frequently 
were rather weak. Whereas some sectoral donor co-ordination arrangements were barely 
existing, others were rather comprehensive, sometimes even complemented by a cross-country 
mechanism for a whole region.30 One key to the explanation of the differences between sectoral 
co-ordination mechanisms are different degrees of functional interdependencies (economic 
linkages, migration movements, ecological spill-overs etc.) between Eastern Europe and 
Western donor countries. The most elaborate co-ordination mechanisms thus are found in case 
of the environment, whereas the education sector, e.g., is hardly being co-ordinated at all. 
Good cases for a direct comparison are the sectors of mass privatisation and agriculture. Both 
are cases of economic restructuring, in both cases enterprises have to be privatised. Whereas 
an effective mass privatisation, however, is a cornerstone of the transformation strategy for 
Eastern Europe, agriculture is of comparatively limited importance (cf. Stratmann 2000: 
73).31 
Given the Western interest in working markets and profitable private enterprises in Eastern 
Europe, most donors were willing to subordinate their assistance efforts to a World Bank-
led privatisation strategy. Although some bilateral donor agencies, such as the United States 
Agency for International Development/USAID and the British Know How Fund/KHF, as well 
as multilateral programs such as the Commissionʼs PHARE and TACIS developed massive 
assistance packages on their own, they were willing to accept the lead role of the World Bank in 
shaping the design of privatisation policies in Eastern Europe. At the core of sectoral assistance 
co-ordination networks was the exchange of influence over the design of  (and the legitimacy 
conferred with the participation within) the comprehensive sectoral adjustment programs of 
the Bank (e.g. Financial and Enterprise Sector Adjustment Loan/FESAL in Romania or the 
Enterprise Development Adjustment Loan/EDAL in Ukraine) and the analytical resources of 
the Bank on the one side, against the legitimacy (political support for the World Bank program) 
and financial resources of other donors, especially to finance technical assistance on a grant 
basis, on the other side:
“While the World Bank commands abundant analytical and programmatic resources and has been in 
a position to influence recipient governments, it nonetheless needed grant funding to complement its 
projects with technical assistance. In contrast, PHARE, TACIS and, to a lesser degree, some bilaterals 
have often had plenty of funds at their disposal but no coherent program of their own; moreover, 
they have relied on the World Bank in leveraging policy change. Thus large World Bank loans have 
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constituted the single most important co-operation mechanism. They have helped to translate the 
universal agreement on the need to privatize quickly into a joint effort to co-ordinate policies on a 
working level” (Stratmann 2000:69).
The political importance of transgovernmental networks becomes obvious, if their role in the 
struggle between privatisation agencies and more conservative recipient ministries is taken 
into account (cf. Meaney 1995: 280-302). Furthermore, the weight and the rather autonomous 
role of the World Bank may be derived from its ability to prevent an alternative privatisation 
strategy which was based on investor-led restructuring (”Treuhand-Modell”), although this 
strategy was firmly propagated by Germany as the most important donor of financial assistance 
to Eastern Europe (cf. Stratmann 2000: 59-61). The utilisation of transgovernmental coalitions 
to further a specific privatisation strategy (and discount the alternative), however, indicates 
that the problem-solving capacity of these networks may be judged differently from different 
standpoints. And from the perspective of input legitimacy, the great political weight these 
networks give to the World Bank staff, and their use against a number of domestic privatisation 
opponents – including factions within the recipients  ʼ parliaments – , is also not without 
problems.
Sectoral co-ordination for agriculture, in contrast, was rather weak. The World Bankʼs sectoral 
specialists do not hide their disappointment:
“There has been relatively little co-ordination of assistance in the area of agriculture, however. The 
different focus of the bilateral and multilateral programs and inability of any of the bilaterals to lead 
financially has precluded strong co-ordination” (Petit/Brooks 1994: 487).
 
As in mass privatisation, the World Bank had tried to assemble comprehensive sectoral 
packages, offering other donor agencies the same resource exchanges as in case of 
privatisation. This time, however, they were less successful. The other donor agencies were 
much less concerned – or pressed from the outside – to come up with their participation in a 
well-structured reform package. They also had less need for the analytical resources of the 
Bank, since the risks entailed with ineffective projects in the agricultural sector were judged 
less severe than in privatisation. In effect, assistance to agricultural restructuring was limited 
in its effectiveness by inconclusive policy advice from Western donors (e.g., regarding 
export-oriented or subsidised agriculture) and was unable to overcome reform blockades 
within recipient political economies through a concerted donor effort (cf. Stratmann 2000: 
78-82). In an over-all perspective, assistance to agriculture in Eastern Europe resembles more 
the traditional, state-centric picture of foreign assistance, where each donor nation uses its 
assistance for its own mercantilist purposes.
 3.5 The Bretton Woods Institutions as addressees: Contesting Global Governance32 
3.5.1 Homogeneity of societal interests: A comparison of different advocacy NGO 
networks and their success in lobbying the World Bank
Numerous advocacy NGO networks mobilise against certain features of World Bank operations 
or the World Bank in general. A comparison of the success of different networks, however, 
demonstrates that there are major differences in success of these networks (cf. OʼBrien et al. 
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2000: 222f, 225). Whereas environmental NGOs have been relatively successful, womenʼs 
issues have been taken up by the Bank to very different degrees and labour unions did hardly 
have any success at all. Robert Wade (1997: 611f) has comprehensively summarised the 
impressive success of environmental NGOs during the last decade in his contribution to a 
recent historical account of the Bank:
“No other field of Bank operations has grown as fast as its environmental activities. Starting with just 
five environmental specialists in the mid-1990s, the Bank employed three hundred a decade later, 
complete with a vice presidency for ʻenvironmentally sustainable development.  ʼ 
In the same period the budgetary resources devoted to explicitly designated environmental work 
(including project preparation and research) grew at 90 percent a year from a very low base, while 
agriculture and forestry resources shrank at 1 percent a year from a high base. 
Before 1987 project officers had wide discretion as to how much attention they paid to environmental 
aspects of their projects, and the Bankʼs work on countrywide policies made only occasional reference 
to environmental problems. After 1987, the Bank established mandatory procedures for subjecting 
projects to environmental review and clearance and began a portfolio of ”environmental” projects, 
the primary objective of which was to improve or rehabilitate parts of the environment. That portfolio 
grew by twelve to twenty-five new projects a year over the first half of the 1990s and amounted to $ 
1 billion to $ 2 billion in new lending commitments. 
At the macro level, the Bank by the mid-1990s had helped virtually all its borrowers prepare 
National Environmental Action Plans (NEAPs), and it began integrating environmental criteria 
into countrywide policies as to link advice about instruments of economic policy such as exchange 
rates, subsidies, and taxes to their effects on environmental sustainability. At least in principle, 
environmental sustainability joined economic growth and poverty reduction to form the core 
objectives for Bank work. 
All this activity was accompanied by an outpouring of high-quality research reports on environment-
development interactions, making the Bank arguably the largest center for such research in the world” 
(Wade 1997: 611f).
Environmental NGOs have played a core role in the “greening” of the Bank. One may even 
call this development one of the most important achievements of the global environmental 
movement (Wade 1997: 613). Especially US-based NGOs led by the National Wildlife 
Federation, the Environmental Policy Institute and the National Resources Defence Council 
have conducted some very successful campaigns, inter alia leading to the establishment of 
the Bankʼs Environmental Department in 1987 (cf. Wade 1997: 657-673). At the core of their 
strategy was the Bankʼs need for additional financial resources, especially in the aftermath 
of the debt crisis. US environmental NGOs – based on information and legitimacy stemming 
from a close collaboration with Southern NGOs representing victims of Bank projects (the 
most famous was those of Polonoreste/Brazil) – successfully lobbied members of the US 
Congress as well as the US Treasury to threat the Bank with a veto to the expansion of its 
capital base, if it doesnʼt change its environmental policy (cf. Wade 1997: 613, OʼBrien et al. 
2000: 127f). One of the keys to the success of the transnational environmental movement was 
the clear dominance of rather moderate Northern NGOs and the very limited degree of North-
South conflicts within the movement. The obvious ecological damage caused by big Bank 
project allowed for a good rallying point for NGOs from the North and the South. A broad 
NGO-coalition would have hardly taken up more radical concerns.
The transnational feminist movement has also been able to institutionalise some of its issues 
within the Bank, e.g. through the establishment of the Gender Sector Board and the External 
Gender Consultative Group. Similarly to environmental NGOs, women NGOs were able 
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to provide Bank staff with valuable analytical resources for a change of Bank policies. In 
comparison with environmental NGOs, however, the organisational changes caused by 
womenʼs NGOs rather pale, leading to only a small faction of the staff that is charged with 
environmental issues (cf. OʼBrien et al. 2000: 8). Women NGOs were most successful if 
they could exchange analytical resources for influence on bank policies, e.g. by proving that 
”women projects” are more profitable than ”conventional” projects (OʼBrien et al. 2000: 48-
50). Other womenʼs issues, however, were hardly accepted by Bank staff at all. This relates 
first and foremost to more radical feminist economics. These economics differ very much from 
neo-classical models favoured by most Bank staff: 
“The two policy discourses could not be more different. Neoliberal economics pitches its analyses 
at the level of the macro economy, whereas feminist economics begins in the microeconomics and 
politics of decision making between women and men in the household. The driving concern of 
neoliberal economics is to improve market efficiency [...] In contrast, the driving concern of feminist 
economics is gender justice, righting the wrongs experienced by women because of their sex [...] 
This approach relies upon interventions to assign value to womenʼs work and to mitigate distortions 
caused by gendered ideologies in institutions such as households, markets and state bureaucracies 
[...]. Neoliberal economists base their predictions of peopleʼs responses to economic signals on 
assumptions about the rationality of individuals [...] Feminist economics are trying to find ways 
of working the politics of gender relations into economics so as to acknowledge the constraints on 
individual choices created by social structure, belief systems and ideologies” (OʼBrien et al. 2000: 
47f).
The concern with feminist economics, however, is not shared by all womenʼs NGOs. While it is 
very popular with southern-dominated NGOs such as Development Alternatives with Women 
for a New Era (DAWN), it is much less popular with moderate northern NGOs, including 
the very well organised and powerful US womenʼs NGOs (cf. OʼBrien et al. 2000: 35-38). 
Conflicts between different parts of the womenʼs movement within the USA, but also between 
womenʼs movement from North and South (i.e. a higher degree of societal heterogeneity) limit 
the amount of resources to be mobilised by womenʼs NGOs for putting pressure on the Bank 
(cf. OʼBrien et al. 2000: 38-40). This has severely limited the range of strategies available to 
influence the Bank:
 
“Womenʼs movements have not attempted the most powerful lobbying manoeuvre in relation to 
the governance and the financing of the World Bank, which is to lobby the more wealthy countries  ʼ
Treasuries to withhold replenishment funding for the IDA in the way the environmental movement 
has done. Womenʼs movements tend to have a much narrower base of support than environmental 
movements and hence cannot exercise the same degree of political leverage. Most importantly, the 
gender and development concern has not been taken up by the US womenʼs movement in a strong 
enough way to support an assault on the Bankʼs funds through Congress” (OʼBrien et al. 2000: 52).
As a result, transnational womenʼs NGOs have been much less successful than environmental 
NGOs to change the policies and operations of the Bank. Internal fragmentation has weakened 
their resource mobilisation in general, while a predominance of US NGOs has limited their 
legitimacy resources in particular. The higher degree of homogeneity of the environmental 
NGOs has led to a better resource mobilisation and, thus, to the development of meaningful 
transnational policy networks between NGOs and the Bank, whereas in case of the womenʼs 
NGOs these networks have been limited to a few issues. Seen in perspective, transnational 
policy networks allow transnational NGOs to exercise some influence on the Bank. But the 
need to assemble sufficient resources and to weigh them in where the Bank is dependent 
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upon them – predominantly in Washington and other Western capitals – limits the range 
of NGOs being able to meaningfully participate within these networks. NGO movements, 
which represent rather heterogeneous interests – especially including an internal North-South 
conflict – have difficulties to successfully participate in these networks. Whereas moderate, 
northern NGOs are favoured, more radical issues are less probable to be taken up by the Bank, 
especially if these issues are hardly reconcilable with the Bank sʼ basic economic strategy.
3.5.2 Policy type: A comparison of World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
regarding their openness to the demands of transnational advocacy NGOs
Differences of the ability of transnational NGOs to influence international secretariats do not 
only stem from features of the NGOs themselves, but also from those of the secretariats. This 
becomes obvious if we compare the different degrees of success of the same environmental 
social movement on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.33 The International 
Monetary Fund has also encountered a broad spectrum of NGOs regarding its stabilisation 
programs, inter alia demanding a better protection of workers; less harmful effects on the poor 
in the East and the South; more ecological sustainability; more sensitivity for gender issues; 
greater attention to good governance activities; a major debt relief; and the democratisation of 
the Fund itself (cf. OʼBrien et al. 2000: 164-171). NGOs used the same tactics on the Fund as 
on the Bank, also threatening its resource base in terms of legitimacy and finance:
“Fund management and staff have become convinced that overtures to trade unions, religious groups 
and NGOs can help construct a – possibly indispensable – popular base for economic restructuring on 
neoliberal lines. In addition, the IMF has been concerned to counter the threat that social movements 
can pose to its financial positions. In particular, critics have repeatedly complicated the approval of 
quota increases and other monies for the IMF on Capitol Hill” (OʼBrien et al. 2000: 203).
Although NGOs were able to temporarily block the contributions by the USA and Ireland to 
the Fundʼs Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility/ESAF (cf. Scholte 1998: 13), it is very 
difficult to prove any causal role between Fund-NGO exchanges and changes within the 
decision-making of the Fund. True, the Fund has slightly modified his conditionalities and 
initiated a debt-relief program for Highly Indebted Poor Countries/HIPC together with the 
Bank (cf. OʼBrien et al. 2000: 177-189), but compared with the Bank, the NGO influence 
on the IMF remained marginal. Thus, OʼBrien et al. (2000: 179) conclude for the case of the 
environment: ”In short, the Fund has responded to pressure from environmental NGOs (and 
in particular the large environmentalist lobby in Washington) by acknowledging the existence 
of links between economic policy and ecological change. However, this recognition has not, 
to date, translated into a major reformulation of IMF prescriptions.” Similarly, the Fund has 
not developed ”advocacy” departments for the concerns of women, the environment etc., as 
did the Bank. Thus, we may conclude that there is a strong relevance of transnational policy 
networks between the Bank and NGOs, but not between the Bank and the Fund. Although 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund became known as the ”Bretton Woods Twins” 
they are, at least by now, two very different organisations, with the Fund being much more 
closed to inter-organisational resource exchanges as the Bank:
“As an organisation, the Fund has been highly monolithic: more so than most global governance 
agencies, or indeed most formal institutions in general [...]. 
Several contrasts between the Fund and the World Bank are striking in this respect. For one thing, the 
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IMFʼs Bretton Woods twin has housed greater diversity of approaches to ʻdevelopment  ʼamongst its 
personnel, including some pockets of major internal dissent. Certain Bank officials have even tried 
to use connections with social movements to promote alternative viewpoints within the organisation. 
The World Bank has also had considerable staff turnover [...]. Indeed there has been some two-way 
flow of personnel between the World Bank and reformist organisations such as development studies 
institutes and development NGOs. 
In contrast to the Bank, the Fund has had little division on the inside and porosity toward the outside. 
The institution has sooner resembled a ʻfamily businessʼ. Traditionally, most officials have joined the 
IMF relatively early in their careers and have then often stayed with the organisation until retirement. 
The agency has tended as a result to be rather insular. No staff mobility has transpired between the 
Fund and social movements. In management style, the Fund has maintained tight central direction and 
rigorous internal discipline” (2000: 191f).
OʼBrien et al. (2000: 213-216) explain the differences between Bank and Fund by referring 
to three factors: ”subject matter”, ”organisational structure” and ”vulnerability to social 
movement action”. In terms of the embedded resource dependency approach to transnational 
policy networks, these three factors all boil down to the different policy types which dominate 
the work of these two organisations. ”Subject matter” directly refers to the differences between 
policies perceived as redistributive and distributive. Distributive policies as those of the World 
Bank carry a strong incentive to gather the information and legitimacy resources of the target 
population, given the need to implement projects successfully:
“[...] the World Bank has been and remains the most sensitive of the institutions toward social 
movements [...] the World Bank runs particular development projects which are more vulnerable to 
disruption by social movements. People can organise against, and possibly prevent, the building of 
a dam more easily than they can affect the decision of the WTOʼs dispute settlement mechanism, for 
example. In a more cooperative vein, social movements can assist in reaching the poor and facilitate 
grass-roots participation” (OʼBrien et al. 2000: 217).
In terms of ”organisational structure” distributive policies give a strong incentive to set up 
”advocacy-” or ”alternative cultures-”departments which are less focused on the pure and narrow 
efficiency criteria of neo-classical economics, but rather on the specific concerns of single 
target groups and sectors. Given their need for external information and legitimacy resources, 
advocacy departments after their establishment become the most important exchange partners 
for transnational NGOs. Finally, in terns of ”vulnerability to social movement action”, the 
World Bank frequently has to legitimate its operations vis-à-vis its shareholders – including US 
Congress – in order to refill its IDA-funds for distributive policies; this exercise is an excellent 
occasion for the mobilisation of information and legitimacy resources by transnational NGOs. 
The issue area of the IMF, finance, is not only traditionally more closed to the public, but also 
does hardly require the co-operation with large groups of the population: “Negotiations over 
debt repayment take place with the elites of countries, not with those who bear the brunt of 
repayment” (OʼBrien et al. 2000: 215). The considerable redistributive effects of IMF programs 
lead to negotiations between Fund and governments, which are largely conducted without 
any public. This ”culture of secrecy”, however, is diametrically opposed to the transparency 
transnational NGOs need in order to build up their pressure. The Fundʼs unwillingness to 
establish advocacy departments leaves NGOs without exchange partners. Finally, the Fund 
is less frequently forced to refill its funds as the IDA, thus reducing its exposure to NGO 
pressure.
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In perspective, the limited relevance of transnational policy networks in case of redistributive 
policies argues for a considerable limitation of the general relevance of these networks. 
Thus, the most important policies and institutions remain outside their reach. Furthermore, 
transnational distributive policies are rare, with the most prominent being foreign and 
humanitarian assistance and some policies (agriculture, cohesion, research& technology) of 
the European Union.34 
4. Conclusion: Water in the “new governance” wine 
4.1 Conditions for the relevance of transnational policy networks
Given that the empirical evidence presented in this paper is only based on a number of brief 
illustrations, conclusions regarding the relevance and the normative dimension of transnational 
policy networks should be made with some care. Still, based on the comparisons outlined 
above, we may expect to find transnational policy networks in situations marked by the 
following features:
 • A high degree of international institutionalisation by international organisations and regimes, 
with the highest degree of institutionalisation to be found within the (first pillar of the) 
European Union;
 • policies which are perceived to be distributive;
 • a high degree of homogeneity of the dominant societal interest in a given sector;
 • a low degree of national institutionalisation of this societal interest;
 • state structures marked by a high degree of institutional fragmentation;
 • existence of a high degree of institutional interdependence between corporate actors on 
different levels of decision-making;
 • a certain level of functional interdependence between territorial units;
 • and a low level of rent seeking.
Although it may be too early to appraise the relevance of these factors definitively, the 
special importance of the factor ʻinternational institutionalisation  ʼ has to be emphasised. 
Thus, I assume that transnational policy networks, for the foreseeable future, are primarily a 
phenomenon of the highly institutionalised “OECD-World”, with its numerous and powerful 
international organisations and regimes.35 Even within the OECD-World, transnational policy 
networks will not be an ubiquitous phenomenon, but will only be relevant under certain 
circumstances, however.  In spite of the implicit modernisation perspective of the first debate on 
transnationalisation – and of large parts of the current discourse on globalisation in general and 
global public policy networks in particular – it is obvious that the factors which are conducive 
to the relevance of transnational policy networks, will not necessarily be more frequent in 
the foreseeable future. Thus, there is not necessarily a general transnationalisation of policy-
making. In contrast, it is also conceivable that the past process, which has led to an increasing 
importance of transnational policy networks in a number of empirical settings, may also be 
reversed. To sum up, the rather enthusiastic perspective on transnational policy networks 
should be tempered down a bit, due to the limited empirical relevance of these networks.
4.2 Normative perspectives on transnational policy networks 
My studies have indicated that transnational policy networks may contribute to sectoral 
problem solving in a number of empirical settings, especially by incorporating the resources 
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of a number of societal, substate and supranational actors into (inter-) governmental decision-
making. Whereas these networks generally appear to be a promising perspective from an 
output-perspective on democratic legitimacy, the assessment from an input-perspective will 
be more sceptical. Compared to decision-making within transnational policy-networks, the 
traditional model of state-centric politics has the advantage that the foreign policies of most 
national governments at least in their general direction are controlled by parliaments. This 
control is lacking in transnational policy networks. Furthermore, we may illustrate the limited 
democratic character of decision-making in transnational policy networks by drawing on the 
more comprehensive experience with policy networks in national settings. Decisions in these 
networks are not made based on votes within democratically legitimised assemblies, but in 
negotiations between the interested corporate actors, under exclusion of the public. Furthermore, 
these decision-making processes are hardly being recorded in reports or other documents and 
are, thus, hardly tangible for outsiders, an obvious contradiction to the democratic criteria 
of transparency and responsibility. In addition, policy networks are not open to all societal 
interests, but only to those which own appropriate resources for an exchange with governmental 
actors. Finally, due to the constitution of policy networks on a sectoral, policy-oriented level 
(“Fachbruderschaften”), these networks are lacking the ability for cross-sectoral co-ordination 
(Benz 1998: 575) – an ability that is an important property of parties, parliamentary coalitions 
and governmental programs. Thus, the contribution of policy networks in terms of problem 
solving has to be specified more clearly; otherwise, policy networks may also exclude superior, 
inter-sectorally co-ordinated solutions to policy problems (Mürle 1998: 31).
In addition to these general problems of policy networks, my studies point towards a number 
of specific shortcomings of transnational policy networks. First, these networks frequently 
are dominated by corporate actors with a rather limited democratic legitimacy, especially in 
the form of international secretariats such as the World Bank and the European Commission. 
Second, the role of NGOs as the universal solution towards problems of legitimacy on the 
transnational level has to be cast into doubt, taking into account the selective representation 
of societal interests on the transnational level, favouring homogeneous interests, which do 
not traditionally rely on the state to favour their interests. Correspondingly, not only unions 
and consumer groups are being restrained in the exercise of influence on the transnational 
level (whereas big multinational enterprises are being favoured), but also within the “NGO 
community” considerable differences of power are obvious, favouring Northern interests. 
Finally, the range of issues which may successfully be addressed by NGOs, will be severely 
limited, given limited exchange resources of most advocacy organisations.
In conclusion, my study indicates the limited suitability of transnational policy networks as the 
new symbol of hope in order to compensate for the restrictions of problem-solving capacity of 
national governments in a democratically legitimate manner. Although these new structures of 
governance provide for an interesting new common subject of study for a number of traditionally 
separate subdisciplines of political science such as International Relations and Comparative 
Politics, a broad-based and legitimate “governing in networks” will be hampered – at least in 
the short term – by the limited empirical relevance and the problematic democratic character of 
these networks. Again, optimistic liberal expectations of a harmonious character of future ways 
of governing appear to be at odds with the reality of postnational politics.
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Notes
   1. During the 1980s, the main representatives of this heuristic have been neorealist and neoliberal approaches, 
whereas the main topics have been international regimes.
    2. Willets (1997) provides for an overview of the activities of diverse non-governmental actors in international 
affairs, whereas Michelmann/Soldatos (1990) discuss the “para-diplomacy” of sub-state actors. On the 
autonomous role of international secretariats cf. Reinalda/Verbeek (1998).
   3. Cf., e.g., Hillebrand (1999) or Messner (1998) and for the specific case of transgovernmental networks 
Slaughter (2000).
    4. Although Reinicke/Deng et al. (2000) treat policy networks as a management instrument, whereas I consider 
them as an analytical perspective, the difference is less grave as may be assumed prima facie. Consider, e.g., the 
close relationship between regime theory and international regimes as instruments for the regulation of world 
affairs. As international regimes, (global) transnational policy networks largely became known as such through 
the classification of external observers, although their existence has a much longer history. 
   5. A third, minor difference relates to the fact that I assume that there are numerous transnational policy 
networks on different levels of policy-making, including also the local and the macroregional (e.g. NAFTA, EU) 
ones, whereas Reinicke/Deng et al. (2000) limit their studies to networks with a potentially global reach. My 
empirical observations, however, indicate strong parallels between transnational policy networks on different 
levels (cf. Nölke 2002). 
    6. Although I take here a more “academic” approach to the normative assessments of policy networks, there is 
considerably similarity in substance, given that Reinicke/Deng et al. (2000) assume that global policy networks 
are effective problem solvers as well as an instrument to close the “participatory gap” in international policy 
making.
    7. In my main study (Nölke 2002), I add a third normative criterium, based on a political economy perspective 
(neoliberalism vs. regulated capitalism). For reasons of brevity, it is left out in this paper.
    8. For a brief introduction into the so-called “Rhodes Approach” to policy networks cf. Rhodes/Bache/George 
(1996).
    9. For a more detailed discussion of the concept of corporate actors cf. Flam 1990.
   10. But see the concept of “functional interdependence” in section 2.2.1 below.
  11. In a more detailed discussion (Nölke 2002), the concept of the homogeneity of societal interests is two-
dimensional: homogeneity thus not only relates to the general “organizability” of different interests, but also to 
the degree of interest convergence between the different national sections of a transnational interest group. 
  12. Compared to these interdependencies, the ones created by regulatory policies are rather weak, thus leading 
to less stable policy networks, cf. Heritier (1993b: 436).
  13. Although we find patronage, corruption and other rent-seeking related phenomena also in the countries of the 
West, the degree of rent-seeking in the South and (parts of) the East is substantially higher.
  14. The main study (Nölke 2002) is based on studies of four empirical settings. Each setting has been chosen 
in order to focus on one particular type of transnational actor: Autonomously acting ministries and international 
secretariats in the co-ordination of economic assistance to Eastern Europe; local and regional governments in 
cross-border micoregionalism; societal groups in the discussion on “international civil society”; and the EU 
system of multi-level governance as a combination of the above, including an important role for business and 
its associations. In each of these setting the applicability of each of the hypotheses outlined above is being 
demonstrated by focused comparisons.
  15. This distinction appears to be related to Mattias Albertʼs/Lena Hilkermeierʼs (2002:17) differentiation 
between (regional) international organisations as organisations or as mere inter-organisational networks/simple 
interaction systems, although in my case it carries much less theoretical weight. For a more detailed discussion of 
autonomous policy-making by international organisations cf. Reinalda/Verbeek (1998).
  16. The focus of my study is on the working-level of these organisations (e.g. Directorates-General of the 
Commission, organisational units of the BWI), thereby exluding the political level (e.g. Commissioners and their 
Cabinets in case of the Commission, Executive Directors in case of the BWI). 
  17. In marked difference to most Europeanists, I do not treat the European Union as a separate, incomparable 
phenomenon. Instead, I assume that we can learn a lot from the study of European level policy networks 
for the study of transnational policy networks in more general, given the very high degree of international 
institutionalization within the Union.
  18. In terms of number of staff alone, both the FAO and the UN headquarter in New York are bigger than the 
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World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (cf. Rittberger 1995: 15). But their financial resources and their 
political influence pale against those of the Commission and the BWI.
  19. With very few exceptions, international organisations also play core roles in each of the global public policy 
networks identified by Reinicke/Deng et al. (2000). 
  20. Again borrowing from Albert/Hilkermeier (2002: 15f) – and loosely referring to the panel title – , the first 
role may be described with change by (exogeneous effects of) international secretariats, whereas the latter as 
change within (endogeneous change of) international secretariats.
  21. These four empirical settings have the added value that they allow for a discussion of the most important 
transnational actors. Besides international secretariats, these actors include local and regional governments (3.1), 
societal groups such as NGOs and business interests (3.2/3.4) and autonomously acting national ministries (3.3). 
  22. The titel refers to the original formulation of the concept which focused very much on the influence of the 
European Commission in the relationships between local/regional authorities and national governemts, cf. Marks 
et al. 1996.
  23. The role of the European Parliament remains limited throughout all three phases.
  24. The same applies for the advocacy departments within the World Bank, cf. chapter 3.5 below.
 25. Similarly to regional development policy, the budgetary phase for all EU S&T subsectors remains firmly 
intergovernmental, cf. Peterson/Bomberg (1999: 209-213).
  26. For a more detailed account of the EITIRT/ESPRIT-story cf. Peterson/Bomberg (1999: 203-206).
  27. Given the large degree of operational autonomy enjoyed by Bank staff in day-to-day operations, I will use 
World Bank and World Bank staff synonymously, even if only the latter forms the international secretariate as 
such.
  28. Transgovernmental networks differ from intergovernmental co-operation in that at least some ministries do 
not represent their national/governmental interest, but follow their own organisational resource dependencies. 
Furthermore, international secretariates play an important role in transgovernmental networks, whereas the 
conventional picture of international organisations is more appropriate for intergovernmental co-ordination. 
  29. This study is based on a survey of assistance co-ordination during the mid-1990s.
  30. For the latter, the “Environment for Europe”-process is a good case in point, cf. Connelly et al. (1993: 
313-318).
  31. This study is based on sector studies in Poland, Romania and Ukraine.
  32. Title borrowed from OʼBrien et al. (2000).
  33. Since Iʼve discussed World Bank-NGO relations in chapter 3.5.1, I now focus on the IMF.
  34. Correspondingly, most studies within Reinicke/Deng et al. (2000) relate to issues of foreign assistance.
  35. Additional support for this conclusion is provided by the factor rent-seeking. Given the detrimental affect 
of extensive rent-seeking to the relevance of transnational policy networks and the higher degree of rent-seeking 
within the former “Second” and “Third World”, the restriction of transnational policy networks to the “First 
World” (and the first world-dominated global level) is further being reinforced.
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